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Abstract
The paper focuses on the structure of contract in Athenian law and the liabil-
ity to comply with. After a short outline of the meaning and the practical rel-
evance of ‘consensual contracts’ in classical Roman law and their further devel-
opment in late Antiquity up to modern times the one-century-old controversy 
about contract in ancient Greek law is resumed: on the one hand the ‘consensual-
ists’ hold that the verb homologein (literally “speak the same”) means “promise 
to comply with debts.” On the other hand the ‘realists’ argue that the binding 
force of a contract was not created by a simple promise, but rather through a 
real basis. The debtor was only liable when he had accepted some goods or assets 
from the creditor and was frustrating the purpose, for which the creditor had 
rendered them to him, the so-called ‘Zweckverfügung’ (disposition for a certain 
purpose, Hans Julius Wolff). One of the crucial sources is the nomos on homologein 
quoted in Hyperides’ speech Against Athenogenes (§ 13). Compared with quota-
tions of similar statutes (Dem. 42.12, 56.2) it will turn out that in technical sense 
homologein was only related to court procedure: “in whatever regard someone 
says the same as another, this is definitive (in the law court)” and did not create 
obligations.
L’articolo si concentra sulla struttura del contratto nel diritto ateniese e sulla 
natura della responsabilità che ne discende. Dopo aver esposto brevemente il 
significato e la rilevanza pratica dei ‘contratti consensuali’ nel diritto romano 
classico, e il loro ulteriore sviluppo dalla tarda antichità fino all’epoca moderna, 
viene riassunta la controversia, ormai secolare, riguardo al contratto nel diritto 
greco: da un lato i ‘consensualisti’ affermano che il verbo homologein (letteral-
mente ‘dire la stessa cosa’) significa “promettere di eseguire la prestazione dovu-
ta”; dall’altro i ‘realisti’ sostengono che l’efficacia vincolante del contratto non 
derivava dalla semplice promessa, ma si fondava su una base reale. Il debitore era 
responsabile solo se aveva accettato determinati beni o vantaggi dal creditore, e 
non realizzava lo scopo che il creditore si era proposto mettendoli a disposizione 
del debitore, la c.d. ‘Zweckverfügung’ (disposizione diretta a uno scopo, Hans 
Julius Wolff). Una delle fonti decisive è la legge relativa all’homologein citata da 
Iperide nell’orazione contro Atenogene (§ 13). In base al confronto con citazioni 
delle medesime leggi (Dem. 42.12, 56.2) ci si può rendere conto che homologein, 
usato in senso tecnico, si riferiva soltanto all’ambito giudiziario: “in tutti i casi 
in cui qualcuno dice la stessa cosa di un altro, ciò non può essere contestato (nel 
corso del processo)”, e non creava perciò obbligazioni. 
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Surprisingly to a modern lawyer, in Athenian trials we never hear 
a party discussing legal questions at the high level of classical Roman 
jurisprudence. Statutes quoted by Athenian litigants mostly are clear 
and seem to fit exactly the case—as presented in the speech. Usually 
the facts of the case are in dispute. Facts not law are the primary top-
ic of oratory.1 One of the few exceptions is Hyperides’ third speech, 
Against Athenogenes. Along with distorting the facts—what we always 
should bear in mind—by reasoning by analogy the speaker refers to 
a sample of more or less relevant statutes. Though vested in rhetoric 
this comes close to professional legal argumentation. Since the op-
ponent had the solid base of a written document and of a statute en-
forcing it—a nomos on homologein—the speaker had no other chance 
than revealing the ‘real meaning’ of this nomos,2 to his mind misused 
by the opponent. Furthermore, in recent discussions about the nature 
of contractual obligation in ancient Greece this speech has become an 
essential argument.
Law of contracts, especially in Athens, is a topic discussed since 
modern jurists started to study Greek law in the beginning of the 20th 
century.3 The question was—and still is: what created the binding 
force of a contract? To modern legal mind it is the agreement between 
the parties. To us breach of contract is breach of a promise voluntarily 
given. Non-juristic scholars predominantly have translated the word 
homologein (literally “speak the same”) simply as “promise.” Recently 
a prominent scholar, Edward Cohen, uttered “one must understand 
the Athenian sources in the most simple way.”4 I agree; but what is 
this simplest way: in our thinking or in that of the ancient Greeks—at 
least as we think they have thought?
In this paper first I will sketch the development of the ‘consensus 
theory’ from the origins in Roman law to our times and the opposing 
‘asset payment theory’ established by Hans Julius Wolff in 1957. Then 
I will return to Hyperides Against Athenogenes, whereupon David Phil-
lips in 2009 has based a revival of consensus, and finally I will oppose 
it by explaining homologein from its origin in Athenian law of proce-
dure. Phillips completely misunderstands, I should think, the Athe-
nian statutes on homologein.
We all know that Roman jurists developed a scheme of four types 
of contract: obligationes re, verbis, litteris, consensu contractae.5 The most 
important contracts in everyday life seem to have been the consensu-
1. Thür, in press.
2. Kästle 2012: 203.
3. Partsch 1909: 32f. was—to my knowledge—the first, who challenged the 
‘debtor’s’ liability from pure consent, “Willenseinigung;” for the ‘cash sale prin-
ciple’ see Pringsheim 1950: 157–79.
4. In discussion during Symposion 2011 in Paris.
5. See Gaius, institutiones 3.89.
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al ones: emptio venditio, locatio conductio, societas, mandatum.6 For these 
neither special formalities nor performing an asset, a real element, 
were necessary; they were based just on the partners’ fides. However, 
in practice Roman consensual contracts plaid a rather inferior role. 
Normally the partners drew a deed and added a stipulatio clause. Origi-
nally stipulatio had been concluded by formal oral question and an-
swer: dari spondes?—spondeo or similar.7 However, in the time of the 
classical Roman jurists the verbal contract changed to an appendix 
within a written contract deed. The usual legal action from such a 
document was the condictio based on the stipulatio and not the actio 
from the consensual contract. Rising actions from the consensual con-
tract was only supplementary.8 The same is true for another impor-
tant everyday contract, the loan: in business life a deed was drawn for 
reimbursing capital and interest, again secured by a stipulatio clause. 
The normal claim for repayment was the condictio based on this stipu-
latio, not the condictio based on the mutuum, the obligatio re contracta,9 
comprising only the capital without interest.
In late Antiquity, with the system of classical Roman actiones the 
formal character of stipulatio was abolished too. Pure consensus was 
sufficient: in 533 Justinian decreed in his Institutes (3.15.1): „These 
solemn words, however, were indeed formerly used, but afterwards 
the Leonine Constitution was promulgated, which dispensed with the 
verbal formality, and required that only the meaning and intention 
should be understood on both sides, no matter in what words they 
were expressed.” The constitution of emperor Leo (CJ 8.37.10) from 
472 was still clearer about consensus: stipulationes quibuscumque ver-
bis pro consensu contrahentium compositae sint. Nevertheless we have to 
bear in mind that at these times a written formal document was essen-
tial for claiming. In the course of European legal history this formal 
requirement vanished and today every mutually declared consensus 
about performance creates a debtor’s responsibility.
This short introduction was necessary for understanding the nature 
of ancient Greek law of contracts. In no way it is self-evident to translate 
the verb homlogein in the most simple sense “promise to comply with 
debts.” On the contrary, there are some serious arguments against it. 
First one can argue ex silentio: in 1957 Wolff noticed that Greek law knew 
no general action for breaking a contract. Different from the Roman sys-
tem of obligationes ex contractu the Greeks also were far away from de-
veloping special claims for performing single obligations coming from 
sale, lease, deposit, loan and so on.10 Thus, what brought about the bind-
ing force of a contract in ancient Greece? By accurately and systemati-
6. Enumerated in Gaius, institutiones 3.135.
7. Gaius institutiones 3.92.
8. For building contracts see Thür 1999: 488–91.
9. See Gaius, institutiones 3.90.
10. Wolff 1957: 34.
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cally scrutinizing the sources Wolff established that not consensus but 
rather some real basis was essential. The debtor was liable if he had ac-
cepted some goods or assets from the creditor and had frustrated the 
purpose for which the creditor had rendered them to him. Mostly in a 
written deed the debtor agreed (homologein) to have received the object 
and concurred in the purpose; normally a penalty was fixed for non-per-
formance. Anyway, the creditor could not claim performance but rather 
had a claim for tort, in Athens a dike blabes for the double sum of the 
actual loss or the penalty the debtor had agreed to. Unluckily, in highly 
abstract words only to be understood by a jurist trained in German civil 
law Wolff denominated this simple theory “Zweckverfügung”11 (dispo-
sition for a certain purpose12). To simplify the matter for non-German 
speakers: the debtor was not responsible for complying with the perfor-
mance he had promised, but rather for compensating the actual loss the 
creditor had suffered by vainly paying his advance.
One can imagine that only a few, mainly German, scholars of Greek 
law have followed Wolff’s theory.13 Recently Barta14 opposed it strong-
ly, Kästle15 let the question open. In Anglo-American scholarship, 
principally consenting to Wolff, in 2006 Edwin Carawan reconsid-
ered the sources of homologein. In knowledge of but discussing nei-
ther Carawan’s nor Wolff’s contributions in any way, in 2009 David 
Phillips returned to consensus as formerly held by Edward Cohen,16 
for example. Phillip’s main argument is the law of homologein quoted 
in the third speech of Hyperides strangely enough not considered by 
Wolff—later I will tell why he had no need to do so. Phillip’s article is a 
good example for the instance that even apparently perfect philologi-
cal research cannot replace legal reasoning.
Surprisingly, Hyperides is not transmitted in medieval manuscripts, 
at least as far as preserved. Some of his speeches are known from 
Egyptian papyri. Recently, large fragments of two of his speeches, well 
known from Byzantine lexica, have been detected in the famous Archi-
medes palimpsest.17 Again, they display him as ingenious logographos 
with high capacity in distorting or misusing statutes as Horváth and 
Rubinstein have shown.18
11. Wolff 1957: 52, 63.
12. In his ‚authentic’ translation Wolff 1966: 325.
13. For example Behrend, Rupprecht, Herrmann, Thür, Jakab; in this paper 
it is not necessary discussing the subtle versions by which the authors modified 
the theory.
14. Barta 2010: 25–28, 489.
15. Kästle 2012: 195.
16. Cohen 2006 opposed by Jakab in her response.
17. Horváth 2008 and 2010.
18. Horváth 2007, Rubinstein 2009.
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Now, what was the case in Hyperides’ third speech? Also this text is pre-
served fragmentarily but well enough to follow the argument. The date is 
between 330 and 324 BC. The speaker, a young Athenian citizen Epicrates 
(§ 24?), a playboy presenting himself as simple peasant, filed a claim for 
damages (a dike blabes as I will show) against a resident alien (metoikos) 
Athenogenes, a perfume dealer. He numbers his blabe five talents, 30,000 
drachmai, but not at all it is sure whether he is claiming the double of this 
huge amount. In Athens rich Athenogenes owned three perfume shops, 
one was run by his slave Midas together with two sons of Midas. Epicrates 
fell in love with one of the boys and wanted to buy him to set him free. 
Athenogenes managed to sell not only the dearly beloved boy but also the 
whole slave family together with the shop to Epicrates for 40 minas. Athe-
nogenes drew up a deed of sale, synthekai, which is read out to the judges (§ 
12) but, as usual, in the speech not preserved as document. We may assume 
that it started with the standard form: ἀπέδοτο Ἀθηνογένης τὸν δοῦλον…
καὶ ὁμολογεῖ ἀπεσχηκέναι τὴν τιμήν· ἐπρίατο Ἐπικρατής... (Athenogenes 
sold the slave Midas together with his two sons serving in his business and 
the perfume shop run by Midas for 40 minas and acknowledges to have 
received the price, Epicrates bought19). As usual the seller, Athenogenes, 
might have named a prater or bebaioter as surety for the case that a third 
person would contest the buyer’s ownership. Furthermore the parties 
agreed that the buyer, Epicrates, assumed responsibility for the debts that 
Midas accumulated in running the shop. Thus, the synthekai most probably 
encompassed the clause “Epicrates acknowledges, homologei, to have taken 
over what Midas owes for the business to Pancalus, Procles, Polycles and 
Dicaiocrates (these ceditors were namely mentioned, §§ 6, 10, 11) and”—
most important for the trial—“whatever Midas owes to anyone else.” (καὶ 
εἰ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὀφείλει τι Μίδας, § 10). For these debts, on his part, Epicrates, 
named a guarantor, Nicon (§ 8), who must have been present at the trans-
action.20 Normally only the buyer was keeping the original of the sale con-
tract to prove his ownership of the purchased goods when they were con-
tested. Since in this case the buyer, Epicrates, had assumed responsibility 
too, the original document was deposited with a third person, Lysicles (§ 
9), so that also the seller, Athenogenes, would be able to submit evidence 
when sued by the creditors. The parties of the deal possessed only copies 
of the document. So far, the business seems to have been transacted in a 
legally correct way and we need not trust in all the strange details of the 
transaction Epicrates tells without any proof.
However the bargain turned out to be a disadvantageous one. If we be-
lieve the speaker—we need not, because it was his concern exaggerating 
the amount—creditors came up demanding repayment of loans of the 
overall amount of five talents (300 minas) they had invested in the busi-
19. See Pringsheim 1950: 103 and Rupprecht 1994: 115 for the most usual form 
in the papyri. In Greek inscriptions—only from outside of Athens—no sale con-
tracts, but rather excerpts from public registers are preserved. For the registers 
the buyer (and present owner) is more important, therefore they start with his 
name: (buyer) ἐπρίατο παρά (vendor).…; see Thür 2008: 176.
20. Pace Phillips 2009: 99, but correctly seen already by Mitteis 1891: 505 n. 1.
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ness, which Epicrates had bought for 40 minas. In this situation Epicrates 
filed the present lawsuit against Athenogenes. In accordance with the still 
prevailing opinion Phillips correctly holds a dike blabes, a private lawsuit 
for damage.21 However, it is quite clear that Epicrates did not yet pay the 
5 talents to the creditors; at the moment he is not yet ruined (apolomai, § 
13). Thus Phillips incorrectly numbers the damage 5 talents.22 As the text 
indicates Epicrates did not even pay a small part of this sum. Meyer-Laurin 
holds that the damage were the 40 minas Epicrates had paid for the over 
indebted shop.23 That’s the only sum Epicrates really had paid (§§ 9 and 
18). Nevertheless, even being convicted of the penalty of the double price 
Athenogenes in no way would be obliged to take back the slaves and the 
shop, and the sale document wouldn’t be automatically canceled. In Athe-
nian law I see no claim for annulling a contract because of being defrauded 
like the Roman actio de dolo with the consequence of restitutio in integrum; at 
least dike blabes is not the right way of automatically getting “release from 
the contract” as Phillips holds,24 also Meyer-Laurin says: “die Nichtigkeit 
des Vertrags nachzuweisen;”25 similarly Barta not even referring to dike 
blabes.26 Only when Epicrates actually will recover his asset, the price of 40 
minas (with the same sum as penalty), ownership of the slaves and the shop 
will backslide to Athenogenes and herewith the real basis of Epictrates’ ho-
mologia assuming responsibility for the debts will vanish. This is the simple 
consequence of the principle ‘owner is who spent the money for the goods’ 
established by Fritz Pringsheim.27 So far to the legal situation of the case.
Now I can switch to the statute, the nomos on homologein referred to in 
§ 13 of the speech, and the Athenian law of contract. Over 14 pages, al-
though discussing neither the legal situation nor the diverging opinions 
on the binding force of Greek contracts, in meticulous philological man-
ner Phillips has reconstructed an assumedly “general law of contract,”28 
quoted in § 13: ὅσα ἂν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ὁμολγήσῃ κύρια εἶναι. He is resum-
ing: “Therefore, according to the Roman and modern typology, this is 
a law of consensual contracts.”29 On his opinion “the law itself must be 
Solonian or later” (p. 106). However, such a general law never existed; 
it would presuppose a general claim for performing contracts substan-
21. Phillips 2009: 91.
22. Phillips 2009: 91 n. 8.
23. Meyer-Laurin 1965: 17.
24. Phillips 2009: 91 n. 8.
25. Meyer-Laurin 1965: 17.
26. Barta 2010: 39.
27. Pringsheim 1950: 205.
28. Phillips 2009: 93–106.
29. Phillips 2009: 106; referring to the seldom use of arrhabon is not at all a 
sufficient discussion of Wolff’s theory of “Zweckverfügung” (n. 49): in the same 
way quoting Wolff’s version of a homologein statute is no contribution to the con-
sensus discussion (94 n. 15).
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tiated neither by Phillips nor by earlier scholarship. Even Roman leg-
islation was far off a similar statute; the proverb pacta sunt servanda is 
concerning collateral agreements (pacta), not contractus in strictly tech-
nical sense. In Antiquity the most self-evident issues needed no rules 
by statutes, especially contracts governed by different principles than 
ours, as we have seen. So we must look for a better understanding of the 
words homologein and kyria than “promise” and “binding,” respectively.
To start with the Hyperides speech: Epicrates is claiming damage. With 
no word he attacks the whole synthekai, but rather the—doubtlessly—
fraudulent clause καὶ εἰ τῳ ἄλλῳ ὀφείλει τι Μίδας (§ 10). This was the 
reason why Epicretes owed debts of five talents when he had bought a 
business only 40 minas worthwhile. In his defense Athenogenes will re-
ply: “you acknowledged the clause and the law of homologein keeps hold 
of you.” Anticipating this defense Epicrates argues τά γε δίκαια, only ac-
knowledgements according to the law are κύρια (§ 13). Phillips correctly 
stresses that the word dikaia was not part of the nomos referred to, and 
his rhetorical interpretation of the following §§14–22 is splendid. One 
may add Kästle’s observation that in forensic practice nomoi were used 
as “Hyperprämisse” (hyper-premise).30 To convince the court Epicrates 
refers to five statutes; though farfetched and irrelevant for his case four 
of them were useful for analogy. § 14: “No one is allowed to tell lies in the 
Agora,” was probably part of a market regulation and concerned every-
day retail business and not selling a whole enterprise. The fact that the 
price was not paid in the dwelling house but rather in the perfume shop 
at the agora (§ 9) does not improve the argument. § 15: “When someone 
sells a slave, he fully must disclose any physical defects the slave may 
have,” concerns the slave market and has nothing to do with debts when 
an entire enterprise is sold with its slave manager and staff; fortunately 
the slaves Epicrates had bought were healthy. Even more farfetched is 
the statute on betrothal where at any rate Hyperides found the words 
“according to the law” (ἐπὶ δικαίοις) in § 16. In § 17 the testament law 
gives opportunity stressing the role of the hetaira Antigona at the begin-
ning recounted without proof—maybe the whole story about her trickery 
is composed to fit exactly this argument. Up to now the tenor is: many 
statutes forbid deceiving the business partner, therefore also the nomos 
of homologein implicitly has this caveat. Text and context of the next stat-
ute, § 21: “for a slave’s zemiai and (whatever) the master is responsible for 
whom he is working,” remain uncertain. Reclusively attributed to Solon 
it forms the climate of Epicrates’ argumentation, nevertheless, this time 
in an abusive way.
To sum up, if someone has bought a business acknowledging taking 
over any debts, he was in a bad position. Against the general rule con-
cerning prudent tradesmen caveat emptor Hyperides resorted in convinc-
ingly narrating mostly unproven facts, farfetched analogies, distorting 
statutes and, maybe most effectively in the second half of the speech, 
discrediting the political and personal behavior of his opponent. 
30. Kästle 2012: 187.
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Assuming responsibility for the debts was only a collateral clause of 
the deed and the performance of the sale as such was beyond contro-
versy. Nevertheless one has to ask: what else could the words homologein 
and kyria mean in this situation than the consensual character of the 
contract? In 1977 I have stressed the exclusive procedural function of 
homologein.31 This will help explaining the Athenogenes case too.
We have to start with a statute, which—at fist glance—seems to be 
far off our problem. For the preparing sessions of a lawsuit, the ana-
krisis before the magistrate or the public diaita, there was stated (Dem. 
46.10): “Both litigants must answer each other’s questions but need not 
to come forward as witnesses.“32 The compulsion to answer only makes 
sense if the party asking the question could hold his opponent to the as-
sertions he conceded. A law cited in Dem. 42.12 serves exactly this pur-
pose: “...(the law) prescribes that homologiai (saying the same) to each 
other, which are delivered before witnesses, are definitive.”33 The men-
tion of witnesses in the law on homologein has a plausible explanation in 
this context: at these pre-trial hearings the litigants always appeared 
with their friends and relatives, who subsequently at the law court were 
brought forward to witness the formal questions and challenges and the 
opponents’ replies. The law should accordingly be understood to mean 
that the litigants were not supposed to dissociate themselves from their 
answers to formal questions, which is not to say that they were bound 
to each and every word that was uttered in a hearing before the jurisdic-
tional magistrate or public arbitrator. Kyria doesn’t mean: “binding to a 
promise” but rather “definitive in the law court.” Only in this way was 
it possible for both sides to induce their opponent to take specific posi-
tions before the ‘battle of words’ at the law court. They thereby laid the 
groundwork for the arguments and objectives that they would include in 
their pleas. The object of the law on homologein was, therefore, the antici-
pated acknowledgement of individual assertions relevant for the trial.
It was not just during the anakrisis or public arbitration that prepar-
atory steps toward clarifying litigants’ positions for trial were taken. 
Moreover, there was the need to bind persons irrevocably to their dec-
larations, even before a charge was filed. This binding was governed 
by another law (Dem. 56.2): “...(the laws) that command that whatev-
er someone voluntarily acknowledges to another is definitive.”34 The 
chance that the word ἑκών can be connected with consensus or lack of 
free will in general is unlikely. According to the situations just exam-
31. Thür 1977: 152–8; recently Carawan 2006: 350 n.18 and Kästle 2012: 194 n. 
158 have accepted my opinion.
32. Dem. 46.10: ΝΟΜΟΣ. Τοῖν ἀντιδίκοιν ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι 
ἀλλήλοις τὸ ἐρωτώμενον, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή.
33. Dem. 42.12: (νόμον) τὸν κελεύοντα κυρίας εἶναι τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
ὁμολογίας, ἃς ἂν ἐναντίον ποιήσωνται μαρτύρων.
34. Dem. 56.2: (νόμοι) οἵ κελεύουσιν, ὅσα ἄν τις ἑκὼν ἕτερος ἑτέρῳ ὁμολογήσῃ, 
κύρια εἶναι
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ined, the expression ἑκών constitutes the criterion for distinguishing 
between the two types of homologiai, acknowledgements: the one given 
in a pre-trial procedure and the one given extra-judicially. The first is 
given under the obligation at least to answer one’s opponent (ἐπάναγκες 
εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, Dem. 46.10); the second type is given when a person 
speaks with his opponent voluntarily and without compulsion to an-
swer (hence ἑκών). Both kinds of homologiai are issued in the same form, 
by simply agreeing to a declaration formulated unilaterally by the other 
party, and both have the same effect: the person who acknowledges the 
content of the declaration may not dispute it afterward in the law court. 
Both procedural statutes no way were Solonian, but rather introduced 
after the statutes on public diaita and—probably—written witness depo-
sition were enacted, anyhow after 403/2.
Returning to our Hyperides speech we see that in the synthekai, in 
the sale contract, homologein did in no way create the binding to any 
performance by consensus: the (conjectured) words “Athenogenes 
sold the slave Midas…for 40 minas and acknowledges to have received 
the price, Epicrates bought…” created no obligation, but rather docu-
mented the transaction already preformed, as recently also Carawan 
clearly has demonstrated.35 Neither could Athenogenes claim the 
slaves and the shop nor Epicrates the money. And even when Epic-
rates “acknowledges to have taken over what Midas owed for the busi-
ness to…(Pancalus etc, namely mentioned) and whatever Midas owed 
to anyone else,” no new obligation was created. When sued by a credi-
tor the law would prohibit Epicrates to contest what he had acknowl-
edged in the deed.36 Speaking with Wolff the real basis of the deal was 
on the one hand that Epicrates paid down the price for the purpose 
Athenogenes handing over the shop and the slaves to him, and on the 
other hand that Athenogenes delivered these objects for the purpose 
Epicrates taking over the responsibility for Midas’ debts. So one can-
not blame Wolff (1957) for not discussing the very special case of the 
third Hyperides speech in his general overview of the binding force of 
contracts in ancient Greek law. Anyway, the speech makes no proof 
that in Athens a promise voluntarily given created an obligation to 
perform.
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